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"Banned in Boston-and Birmingham and
Boise and . .. ": Due Process in the
Debarment and Suspension of
Government Contractors
By JOHN MONTAGUE STEADMAN*
THE United States government spends over $50 billion annually in
procurement from the private sector.1 Access to this Niagara of govern-
ment spending is very big business indeed, involving tens of thousands
of firms;2 for some, it is the major, or even sole, source of income. To
be barred, permanently or temporarily, from the competition for govern-
* B.A., 1952, Yale College; LL.B., 1955, Harvard Law School. Professor of
Law, Georgetown University; member, California and District of Columbia Bars. This
article is based upon a report by the author as consultant to the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States. However, the Conference has not evaluated or approved the
report or this article. Responsibility for their contents is solely my own. I would like
to express my appreciation to my research assistant, D. Edward Wilson, for his valuable
and cheerfully rendered assistance. The Administrative Conference of the United States
was permanently established by Congress in 1964 to study the efficiency, adequacy, and
fairness of federal administrative practices and procedures.
1. Exact annual figures are hard to obtain. One report estimated that in fiscal
year 1972, the Department of Defense (DOD) spent approximately $39.4 billion out
of a total procurement budget of $57.5 billion, followed by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC) ($2.9 billion), the Department of Agriculture (DOA) ($2.6 billion), the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ($2.5 billion), the General
Services Administration (GSA) ($1.3 billion), and other agencies and accounts ($8.8
billion). See 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 3 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as COGP REPORT].
2. In the Defense Department alone, more than 20,000 contractors are involved
in prime defense and aerospace research, development, and production programs. These
20,000 contractors select more than 100,000 subcontractors. It is true that a relatively
small number receive the majority of the procurement dollars. For example, in 1970,
the top 100 defense contractors received 69.7% of all defense spending. With a de-
fense procurement budget in the area of $40 billion, however, the remaining 30.3%
constitutes a substantial sum. See J. Fox, ARMING AMERICA 41, 43 (1974).
[793]
ment contracts can be a matter of fiscal life and death to government
contractors.
Some fourteen years ago, the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) conducted what was rightly termed "the most
thorough research job ever done on the actual facts of debarment and
suspension by the federal government."4  The cardinal recommenda-
tions emerging from the study related to the woeful due process inade-
quacy of the procedures leading to debarment and suspension. The
purpose of this article is to trace subsequent developments, which form
an intriguing example of the complexities of effecting administrative
reform in the federal government in even a relatively limited area of
activity.
Substantive Grounds for Debarment or Suspension
For almost half a century,5 the federal government's procurement
process has provided for the debarment or suspension 6 of potential
3. For example, one contractor, at the time of its summary suspension, did
95% of its business with the Department of Defense and 5% with the Coast Guard.
Brief for Appellant at 6, Home Bros., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 73-1325 (D.C. Cir., filed
March 26, 1973). See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
4. Gantt & Panzer, Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Con-
tracts and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 5 B.C. IND. & COM. L
REV. 89, 92 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Gantt & Panzer]. This article also cites sev-
eral early congressional hearings and a study by the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure in 1939. See id. at 89. Gantt & Panzer had earlier been the
co-authors of a pioneering study in the field. See Gantt & Panzer, The Government
Blacklist: Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Contracts, 25 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 175 (1957). See also Miller, Administrative Discretion in the Award
of Federal Contracts, 53 MICH. L. REV. 781 (1955).
5. The first statute expressly authorizing debarment was the Buy American Act
of 1933, ch. 212, §§ 1-3, 47 Stat. 1520 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-d (1970)). Ad-
ministrative debarments were recognized by the comptroller general as early as 1928.
Gantt & Panzer, The Government Blacklist: Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on
Government Contracts, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 175, 185 (1957).
6. Precise distinctions between the two terms are in many respects technical. A
debarment follows agency determination that stated grounds for such action in fact exist.
See ASPR 1-604 to -604.3, 3 GOV'T CONT. REP. I 32,162-32,162.5 (1975); 41 C.F.R.
§§ 1-1.601-1 to -1.602-1 (1975). A suspension may occur when such grounds are only
suspected to exist; the most common situation involves suspicions of fraud or criminal
conduct by a prospective contractor. See ASPR 1-605, 3 GOV'T CONT. REP. 32,163
(1975); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605 (1975). Suspension occurs only on grounds of nonrespon-
sibility. See notes 17-19 & accompanying text infra. The word "ineligibility" is used
with respect to determinations under the Walsh-Healey Act that a firm is not a manufac-
turer or regular dealer of goods of the kind involved and to determinations that a firm
has violated the equal opportunity clause. Walsh-Healey Act § 1 (a), 41 U.S.C. § 35(a)
(1970). See, e.g., ASPR 7-103.18, 4 GOV'T CONT. REP. V 33,636.90 (1975). Regula-
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government contractors. 7 Such actions bar private entities, on a depart-
ment-wide and often government-wide s basis, from receiving awards of
government contracts,' with possibly devastating economic effects. The
substantive grounds for the government's drastic action reflect the dual
nature of the government as it enters the marketplace. On the one
hand, the government is no different from any other buyer who seeks
the best quality at the lowest price from reliable sellers. But on the
other hand, the government is the sovereign, seeking by diverse means
tions of the Environmental Protection Agency refer to a "list of violating facilities ....
ineligible for federal contract." 40 C.F.R. § 15.1(c) (1975). The two actions, how,
ever, have the same practical effect on the private entity: exclusion for a period of time
from awards of some or all government contracts.
7. The distinction between government contracts and government grants, while
generally understood, is at times less than precise. See 3 COGP REPORT, supra note
1, at 155-60; Boasberg & Hewes, The Washington Beat: Federal Grants and Due Proc-
ess, 6 URBAN LAw. 399 (1974). Generally, it may be said that a contract is an agree-
ment for the procurement of property or services for the government. See ASPR 1-
201.4, 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,036.20 (1975); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.208 to -.209 (1975).
In contrast, a grant is the provision of money, services or property by the government
for the purpose of aiding or assisting a nonfederal activity. 3 COGP REPORT, supra
note 1, at 153 n.3. Legislation has been proposed to clarify and distinguish the two
concepts. See S. 1437, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Federal procurement is generally
governed by the Armed Services Procurement Act for the Department of Defense and
NASA, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1970), and by the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act for most other agencies, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-60 (1970), together with imple-
menting regulations. See Grossbaum, Procedural Fairness in Public Contracts: The
Procurement Regulations, 57 VA. L. REv. 171 (1971).
8. One of the grounds for debarment is such action taken by another agency.
ASPR 1-604.1(iv), 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,162.05 (1975); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604(a)(6)
(1975). Furthermore, debarments on "inducement" grounds usually apply automatically
government-wide, although not necessarily to all forms of contracts.
9. Inducement debarments and Walsh-Healey determinations of ineligibility may
be applicable to only certain classes of contracts. For example, the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations (ASPR) carefully distinguish six categories of debarment. See
ASPR 1-603(a), 3 GOV'T CoNT. REP. 32,161 (1975). The Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), on the other hand, provides that its debarments apply
not only to its procurement, but also to direct or indirect participation in its grant and
loan guarantee programs. See 24 C.F.R. § 24.3 (1975). Debarment under the labor
acts also broadly affects contractors and subcontractors of federally-assisted construction.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 5.0-.14 (1975). A debarred entity is likewise ineligible to participate
as a subcontractor in a government contract for which government approval of subcon-
tractors is required. ASPR 1-603(c), 3 GOV'T CONT. REP. 1 32,161 (1975); 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-1.603(e) (1975). The time period of a debarment is a mandatory three years under
the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a-2(a) (1970), and the Buy American Act, 41
U.S.C. § 10b(b) (1970). Otherwise, the period is discretionary, not to exceed three
years without further proceedings, and the debarment may be lifted at any time. ASPR
1-604.2(a), 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. f 32,162.10 (1975); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604(c) (1975).
A recent trend in inducement debarments, however, is to debar until compliance is
achieved. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 15.20(c) (1975).
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to carry forward national social and economic policies. The substantive
grounds for debarment and suspension reflect both roles.' °
"Nonresponsibility" Debarment
Like any private buyer in the marketplace, the government seeks to
deal only with honest, reliable sellers. The concept of the "responsible
bidder" is deeply imbedded in government contract law. It was early
held that "the term 'responsible' means something more than pecuniary
ability; it includes also judgment, skill, ability, capacity, and integrity.""
Thus, regulatiohs today expressly require that before the government
may award a contract, the contracting officer must make an affirmative
determination, in accordance with listed criteria, that the prospective
contractor is responsible; included in the list are requirements that the
contractor have a satisfactory record of performance and "of integri-
ty."12
Debarment and suspension for nonresponsibility are in substance
blanket determinations that such standards are not met.' 3 Through
10. A notably lucid analysis of the distinction between these two roles and indeed
of the whole area of this study may be found in Debarment of Government Contractors
and the Requirements of Procedural Due Process, BNA FED. CONT. REP. No. 530, at
K-1 (May 13, 1974). For a similarly excellent discussion of these issues, see A.
Lahendro, The Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors: Who's on
First?, 1975 (unpublished thesis on file at the National Law Center at George Wash-
ington University).
11. O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761, 762 (D. Mass. 1934).
12. ASPR 1-903.1, 3 GOV'T CONT. REP. 32,248 (1975); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1203-1
(1975).
13. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has commented on this process as fol-
lows: "Mhe evaluation of integrity and business ethics in determining responsibility
is undeniably difficult. These elements are not only relative in nature but their measure-
ment is complicated, additionally, by the necessity of estimating the extension, if any,
of particualr conduct into and through a future period of performance. For these rea-
sons, the formulation of precise rules defining limits within which discretion to debar
properly may be exercised in the general 'integrity' area does not appear to be feasible.
The observation may be made, however, in the light of factors so far considered in our
decisions, that a lack of integrity such as would justify a determination of irresponsibility
and the imposition of debarment should be predicated upon a reasonable expectation,
evidenced by something more than an accusation, an unrelated offense, or an offense
remote in time, that an impairment of responsibility exists which will interfere with cur-
rent satisfactory pelformance of a Government contract." SENATE SUBCOMM. ON AD-
MINISTRATIvE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as ACUS REPORT].
The power of executive procurement agencies to debar or suspend on an across-the-
board basis is implied from the requirement that a bidder be "responsible." See, e.g.,
10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1970); 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1970). See also Gonzalez v. Free-
man, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell,
290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Schlesinger v. Gates, 249 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
It is thus asserted that unless debarment or suspension is expressly authorized by statute,
[Vol. 27
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regulations, the procuring agencies have provided that contractors may
be debarred on a department-wide basis following: 1) convictions of
criminal offenses which relate to the procurement process or otherwise
indicate a lack of business integrity or business honesty, and/or 2)
serious violations of prior government contracts.'14 Debarments are not
such action can be taken only insofar as nonresponsibility is in issue and not as a pen-
alty or punitive measure. See text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
14. The full text of a typical provision reads:
"Causes for debarment. The following are causes for debarment:
"(i) conviction by or a judgment obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction
for-
"(A) commission of fraud or a criminal offense as an incident to obtaining, at-
tempting to obtain, or in the performance of a public contract;
"(B) violation of the Federal antitrust statutes arising out of submission of bids
or proposals; or
"(C) commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruc-
tion of records, receiving stolen property, or any other offense indicating a lack of busi-
nesss integrity or business honesty which seriously and directly affects the question of
present responsibility as a Government contractor.
"If the conviction or judgment is reversed on appeal, the debarment shall be re-
moved upon receipt of notification thereof. The foregoing does not necessarily require
that a firm or individual be debarred. The decision to debar is discretionary; the seri-
ousness of the offense and all mitigating factors should be considered in making the deci-
sion to debar.
"(ii) clear and convincing evidence of violation of contract provisions, as set forth
below, when the violation is of a character so serious as to justify debarment action-
"(A) willful failure to perform in accordance with the specifications or delivery
requirements in a contract (including violation of the Buy American Act with respect
to other than construction contracts);
"(B) a history of failure to perform, or of unsatisfactory performance, in accord-
ance with the terms of one or more contracts; Provided, That such failure or unsatisfac-
tory performance is within a reasonable period of time preceding the determination to
debar. (Failure to perform or unsatisfactory performance caused by acts beyond the
control of the contractor shall not be considered as a basis for debarment);
"(C) violation of the contractual provision against contingent fees; or
"(D) violation of the Gratuities clause, as determined by the Secretary in accord-
ance with the provisions of the clause.
"(iii) for other cause of such serious and compelling nature, affecting responsibil-
ity as a Government contractor, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Depart-
ment concerned to justify debarment; or
"(iv) debarment for any of the above causes by some other executive agency of
the Government. (Such debarment may be based entirely upon the record of facts ob-
tained by the original debarring agency, or upon a combination of additional facts with
the record of facts obtained by the original debarring agency.)" ASPR 1-604.1, 3 Gov'T
CoNT. REp. 32,162.05 (1975).
Comparable provisions appear in the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR). See
41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604 (1975). Sometimes special grounds are added; for example, HUD
states as a ground of debarment failure to pay debts due to HUD, and provides several
other grounds reflecting the fact that its debarments apply to grants as well as contracts.
See 24 C.F.R. §§ 24.7(h), 24.9 (1975). Special provisions relative to grounds of de-
to punish such actions but only to protect the interests of the govern-
ment:15 the General Accounting Office (GAO) has repeatedly stressed
nonresponsibility as the sole acceptable basis for any administrative
debarments not expressly authorized by statute. 6
The suspension process was developed to meet the situation
presented when a prospective government contractor was merely sus-
pected of offenses of the type which would authorize debarment.' 7  In
such cases, if "adequate evidence" of such wrongdoing exists,18 the
contractor may be suspended pending further investigation. Of course,
from the contractor's view the effect is the same as a debarment, but
analytically the process is only a prelude to possible debarment. Since
suspension is based upon possible nonresponsibility of a contractor, it is
used only in that connection and is not found in situations involving
"inducement" debarment, to be discussed in the next section. 19 It is in
the suspension process, perhaps, that the greatest tension exists between
the government's desire for unhampered participation in the market-
barment and maintenance of lists apply to overseas defense procurements, which will
not be otherwise treated in this report. See ASPR 1-609, 3 Gov'T CorN. REP. 32,167
(1975).
15. ASPR 1-604, 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,162 (1975); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.601
(1975). The latter specifically states that debarments "should preclude awards only for
the probable duration of the period of non-responsibility."
16. For a good summary of this entire area, see ACUS REPORT, supra note 13,
at 297-302.
17. The ASPR, for example, read:
"Causes for suspension. The Secretary or his authorized representative (see § 1.600
(b) ) may, in the interest of the Government, suspend a firm or individual:
"(i) suspected, upon adequate evidence, of-
"(A) commission of fraud or a criminal offense as an incident to obtaining, at-
tempting to obtain, or in the performance of a public contract;
"(B) violation of the Federal antitrust statutes arising out of the submission of
bids and proposals; or
"(C) commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruc-
tion of records, receiving stolen property, or any other offense indicating a lack of busi-
ness integrity or business honesty, which seriously and directly affects the question of
present responsibility as a Government contractor; or
"(ii) for other cause of such serious and compelling nature, affecting responsibil-
ity as a Government contractor, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Depart-
ment concerned to justify suspension. Suspension of a firm or individual by the Secre-
tary or his authorized representative shall operate to suspend such firm or individual
through the Department of Defense." ASPR 1-605.1, 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,163.05
(1975).
18. The regulations make it clear that an unsupported accusation is not enough
and set forth the way in which the adequacy of the evidence is to be assessed, the con-
siderations to be taken into account, and the documents to be examined. See ASPR 1-
605, 3 GOV'T CONT. REP. 32,163 (1975); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605(b) (1975).
19. See notes 20-34 and accompanying text infra.
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place and constitutional and policy limitations on its freedom of action.
A private buyer could refuse to deal with a seller on a whisper of
suspicion. Not so, perhaps, the sovereign.
Because the procurement statutes do not expressly provide for the
use of department-wide debarments and suspensions on the grounds
discussed above, such actions are sometimes called "administrative"
debarments and suspensions. One may suggest, however, that it is more
precise, in view of the theoretical purpose and statutory derivation of
such actions, to term them "nonresponsibility" debarments and suspen-
sions. Furthermore, the term "nonresponsibility" more clearly discrimi-
nates such debarments from "inducement" debarments, which are taken
to further social and economic goals unrelated to the procurement
process.
"Inducement" Debarment
Unlike a private buyer, the government is interested, as the sover-
eign, in achieving a wide variety of social and economic goals. The
leverage provided by the sheer size of the government's procurement
budget is a tempting weapon to use in furthering such goals.20 Specifi-
cally, the government, by statute or regulation or by inclusion as a term
in a government contract, prescribes a norm of conduct designed to
promote social or economic goals, and if a private entity fails to comply
with that norm, one of the possible sanctions may be to deny the private
entity the right to receive government contracts. This sanction may
take the form of an outright ban on any government business for a set
period of time or of a ban which continues until the private entity
complies with the prescribed norm of conduct.21  In either event, the
aim is to induce governmentally desired conduct. 22
20. One of the early uses of the power was the extension in 1892 of the mandatory
eight-hour day to workers employed by contractors and subcontractors engaged in federal
contracts. In 1905, an executive order prohibited the use of convict labor on govern-
ment contracts, carrying out the policy of an 1887 statute prohibiting the hiring-out of
convict labor. See 1 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-24. See generally Morgan,
Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an Uncon-
strained Administrative Process, 1974 WIs. L. R v. 301.
21. As already mentioned, only the Buy American Act and the Davis-Bacon Act
make the three-year period mandatory. In other cases, the stated period of debarment
may be a fixed term, but, in the case of norms related to contract performance, it is
provided that the debarment may be lifted if compliance with the stated norm has oc-
curred or seems likely to occur. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(b) (1) (1975).
22. In the case of mandatory fixed-term debarments, of course, the debarment is
in effect a penalty and induces not so much the punished party as others who might
otherwise be tempted to stray. To be sure, it may induce the punished party not to re-
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Such inducement goals, which the government as sovereign impos-
es on contractors, are often antithetical to the aims of the government in
its capacity as buyer since the government's conditions reduce the
number of potential bidders or add costs which are unrelated to the
procurement process itself. Debarment on such grounds, therefore, is
invoked only when the social or economic goal pursued has been
expressly recognized as one which the leverage of the governmental
procurement process should be used to further. Normally, Congress
has made this determination in passage of legislation establishing the
norm of conduct; hence debarment on such grounds is often called
"statutory debarment," 3 in contrast to "administrative" debarment.
Again, however, one may suggest that in view of the theoretical purpose,
it is more precise to use the term "inducement" debarment. Further-
more, such usage recognizes that occasionally the only express authori-
zation for inducement debarments is found in executive orders or ad-
ministrative regulations, 24 with the power to promulgate inducement
debarments derived only inferentially from underlying statutory or con-
peat the offense. One of the ACUS recommendations in 1962 was to eliminate the
mandatory fixed term. See ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 63, 270, 293-95.
23. Illustrative of the difficulty in such terminology, however, is the fact that the
secretary of HUD is expressly authorized by section 512 of the National Housing Act
to make a blanket denial of participation in a wide series of HUD loan programs,
whether directly as a lender or borrower or indirectly as a builder or the like, to persons
who have violated provisions of the National Housing Act or the related Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA) loan program. 12 U.S.C. § 1731a (1970). Such debarments, how-
ever, seem to have as their basic concern the responsibility of the participant and are
not intended as inducements to achieve other social and economic goals. Conversely,
some inducement debarments lack express statutory authority. See note 24 infra.
24. See, e.g., Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) (debarment for violations of labor standards); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 169 (1974) (debarment for violations of the equal opportunity clause); 40
C.F.R. § 15.20 (1975) (debarment for violations of environmental protection regula-
tions). By the GAO analysis, all these grounds would presumably involve "nonresponsi-
bility" determinations; the legal theory seems to flow from the thought that if a con-
tractor violates a federal statutory or regulatory requirement (or a contractual term in-
serted pursuant thereto) he is inherently "nonresponsible." The difficulty analytically
is that the statutory or regulatory requirement really has no intrinsic relationship to the
integrity of the procurement process, but is inserted for other purposes. For example,
while the government is concerned about the employment conditions or pollution stand-
ards of a seller, it would be unusual for a private buyer to share this interest. The due
process and policy considerations relating to debarment and suspension on nonresponsi-
bility grounds could differ conceptually from those applicable to debarment and suspen-
sion on inducement grounds. Such considerations could become increasingly important
if, as has been noted with some apparent concern, the procurement process is increas-
ingly recognized as a means of implementing government social and economic policies.
1 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-24.
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stitutional provisions. In this sense, of course, so-called "administra-
tive" debarments are also statutory.
The statutes providing for inducement debarments fall into three
major categories:
(1) A series of well-known labor standards acts, most notably
the Davis-Bacon Act,25 Walsh-Healey Act,2 6 Contract Work Hours
and Safety Standards Act,2 7 and Service Contract Act of 1965,28
prescribe wage rates and other working conditions that must be
followed;
(2) The Buy American Act29 provides generally for the
use of American-produced materials in connection with govern-
ment contracts (subject, of course, to exceptions); and
(3) The Clean Air Act30 and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act amendments of 19721 contain numerous provisions
to prevent and control air and water pollution.
In addition, an inducement debarment may follow when a contractor
25. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to a-5 (1970). A number of related statutes require wage
payments similar to those specified in Davis-Bacon but may not contain express debar-
ment authority for violation. The Labor Department provides for a single administra-
tive debarment procedure for violations of Davis-Bacon and about 30 related statutes,
presumably relying on the technical "nonresponsibility" rationale already discussed and
the close analogy of the related statutes to Davis-Bacon in which the debarment sanc-
tion is expressly authorized. See 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(c) (1975). Such action was sus-
tained in Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
26. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
27. 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-33 (1970). Section 333(d) deals with safety and health
standards and permits debarment on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.
Otherwise debarment is not expressly authorized.
28. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-57 (1970).
29. Id. §§ 10a-d. By its terms the debarment authority under the act ap-
plies only to construction contracts, although the requirement to buy American
items applies to all contracts. Id. § 10b(a). Violation of the act by noncon-
struction contractors is thus made an administrative ground of debarment. Oddly
enough, this application of the act is appropriate if one believes all administrative debar-
ments must turn on "responsibility." See, e.g., ASPR 1-604.1 (ii) (A), 3 GOV'T CONT.
REP. 1 32,162.05 (1975).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970).
31. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV, 1974). Executive Order 11,738 prohib-
ited all agencies from entering into any contract to be performed at a facility which had
given rise to a conviction for violating the air or water acts or from extending federal
assistance by grant or loan or contract which would support a program or activity involv-
ing the use of such a facility. Exec. Order No. 11,738, 3 C.F.R. 373 (1974); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-4 (Supp. IV, 1974). Relying on its power to set forth procedures, sanctions,
and penalties, the Environmental Protection Agency in its implementing regulations has
also provided for the listing of facilities prior to conviction in certain cases. See 40
C.F.R. § 15 (1975).
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violates the nondiscrimination provisions imposed on government con-
tractors.32
The wonder may be that Congress has not enacted more statutes
expressly authorizing debarment to further desired social or economic
goals. Given the potential of the leverage, the Clean Air and Water
Pollution Control Act amendments may presage things to come.
3 Of
course, the procurement process includes other methods besides debar-
ment to further social and economic goals. For instance, small busi-
nesses may compete on preferential terms, labor surplus areas may be
given special treatment, and price differentials may be paid in certain
cases. One may venture to say that the procurement community tends
to view such use of the procurement process for nonprocurement goals
with limited enthusiasm, as adding numerous obligations and adminis-
trative complexities for government contracting officers. A report by
the Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) devotes an
32. Until recently, the only provision in this area was Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 C.F.R. 169 (1974). Implementing regulations have been issued by the Office of Fed-
eral Contract Compliance of the Department of Labor. In brief, each government con-
tract and federally-assisted construction contract must contain an equal opportunity
clause. Violation may, among other things, lead to debarment or more technically to
being declared ineligible for such contracts. See id. § 209(a)(6), 3 C.F.R. 169,
174 (1974). The provision has its roots in an action by President Roosevelt
in 1941 banning discrimination in defense contracts. See Exec. Order No. 8,802,
3 C.F.R. 957 (comp. 1938-1943). Implied authority in the president to include such
requirements in government contracting has been sustained. Contractors Ass'n v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). The case
did not involve or discuss expressly the question of authority to debar as a sanction for
violation of the clause. Cf. United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138
(1966) (contract may be canceled for violation of antikickbaek law, although statute
does not expressly so provide); Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d
368 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Authority under Executive Order 11,246 should be distinguished
from that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-
5 (1970), which prohibits discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. The act limits the withholding of financial assistance to the par-
ticular program, or part thereof, in which the noncompliance occurred. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1 (1970). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) regula-
tions, for example, require a full APA-type hearing prior to any such action. See 45
C.F.R. § 80.9 (1974).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 imposed a statutory requirement that government
contractors agree to take affirmative action to employ qualified handicapped individuals
and that such individuals not be discriminated against in federal grant programs. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (Supp. IV, 1974). Implementing regulations provide for possible
debarment of a contractor who fails to comply. See 20 C.F.R. § 741.27-.36 (1975);
41 C.F.R. §§ 1-12.1300 to -12.1310-2 (1975).
33. The Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. IV, 1974), 49
U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. IV, 1974), contained a debarment provision as it passed the Sen-
ate which was deleted in the House. 1 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 123 n.56.
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entire chapter to a discussion of this area.34
Evolution of Procedures for Debarment
and Suspension
Given the potentially searing impact of debarment or suspension,
the procedures leading to such actions have been the subject of repeated
scrutiny as to their fairness and adequacy. One may perhaps outline the
present situation most effectively by tracing the evolutionary history of
debarment and suspension procedures over the past dozen-odd years.
The 1962 ACUS Study
Any analysis of debarment and suspension must begin with the
monumental examination undertaken by the ACUS early in the
1960's. 35 Under the direction of then Department of Defense General
Counsel Cyrus R. Vance, the committee on adjudication of claims
submitted an extensive report including nine recommendations concern-
ing the debarment and suspension process.36 The conference adopted
all the recommendations, which had been made "after ascertaining the
detailed views of the Government departments and agencies concerned
and of a special subcommittee of the American Bar Association."37 The
recommendations covered several aspects of the process, but a central
finding of the committee was that "[e]xcept for a small percentage, this
Governmental action [of debarment or suspension] is taken without
opportunity for an adversary hearing and if based on suspected criminal
conduct is generally without being officially notified or informed of
meaningful reasons, or opportunity to learn why."38
34. Id. at 111-24. See also Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through Federal
Contracts: Giving Form to an Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 Wisc. L.
REv. 301. See text accompanying notes 43-50 infra.
35. The administrative conference referred to was established by Executive Order
in 1961, to complete its work and terminate by the end of 1962. The conference con-
sisted of an 11-member council and 75 additional participants, of which 46 were from
the federal government and 29 from private life. The chairman was Judge E. Barrett
Prettyman. See Fuchs, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 15 ADMIN.
L. REv. 6 (1963); Gantt & Panzer, supra note 4, at 89. The present permanent
body of the same name was established pursuant to the Administrative Conference
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 388 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1970)),
and was activated in 1968. (President Eisenhower had also established a temporary
conference in 1953.)
36. For a full reprint of the report with its recommendations see ACUS REPORT,
supra note 13, at 265-95. The text of the recommendations alone appears in Fuchs, The
Administrative Conference of the United States, 15 ADMIN. L. REv. 6, 23-45 (1963).
37. ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 280.
38. Id. at 273.
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As a result, the ACUS proposed as its central and probably most
controversial recommendation that any initial debarment action should
be preceded by an "opportunity for a trial-type hearing before an
impartial agency board or hearing examiner in the event there are
disputed questions of fact relevant to the debarment issue";"9 in other
words, that such debarment should be made only after the equivalent of
the sort of hearing provided for in section 7 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.4" On the related problem of indefinite suspension,4' the
committee recommended a limit of eighteen months per suspension, a
requirement of substantial grounds of suspected nonresponsibility, and
the availability of high-level review.
The final ACUS report, containing these recommendations along
with the numerous other ones adopted by the conference, went to
President Kennedy at the end of 1962. President Kennedy, in acknowl-
edging its receipt and thanking the ACUS for its recommendations,
stated:
I have instructed the appropriate Government departments to con-
sider them and report to me upon the best method to assure their
implementation. I am confident that actions on these recom-
mendations will contribute materially to improved administration
of Federal regulatory programs. 42
39. id. at 267.
40. Id. at 281. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970). The special subcommittee of the
American Bar Association (ABA) commenting on the recommendation thought it did
not go far enough, in that it was limited to cases in which a material fact was in dis-
pute. They asked that the recommendation be broadened to permit an opportunity to
explain and to demonstrate present responsibility as a contractor, even when prior
wrongdoing was admitted. In reply, the ACUS report noted that when a hearing was
held, obviously such arguments could be made; when it was not, the arguments could
be made to the debarment official. It also stated: "While decision of whether there
are such issues warranting a trial-type hearing would rest with the agency proposing de-
barment, it is contemplated that such decisions would not be made on narrow technicali-
ties or reflect an inhospitable view of what are disputed material facts." ACUS REPORT,
supra note 13, at 283-84; cf. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HAuv.
L. REV. 193, 218-22 (1956).
41. The report had found that firms suspected of fraud or other criminal conduct
in their government dealings were suspended pending investigation and action by the De-
partment of Justice for indefinite periods that frequently exceeded three years, in some
cases without even an opportunity to know the reasons or the evidence supporting the
suspension. See ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 276.
42. Id. at iv; see Gantt & Panzer, supra note 4, at 101. The Gantt and Panzer
article contains an excellent summary of the activities of the 1962 conference with re-
spect to debarment and suspension. The president's instruction was followed up in a
bulletin by the Bureau of the Budget. See id.
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The COGP Report
In its extensive report in December of 1972, the COGP43 reexam-
ined the debarment and suspension processes.44 Among other matters
it referred at length to the ACUS report and related the progress (or
lack thereof) in implementing the recommendations. The COGP re-
port noted that with respect to debarments, "to date, adversary hearings
are required only for debarments under the Walsh-Healey and Service
Contract acts, and Executive Order 11246," 45 and that with respect to
suspensions, as a result of a recent case46 new regulations were being
prepared. Formal recommendation 46 of the commission urged the
government to "revise current debarment policies to provide for uniform
treatment for comparable violations of the various social and economic
requirements and to establish a broader range of sanctions for such
violations. 47 The text of the report also noted the lack of uniformity
among debarment and suspension procedures and the uncertainty con-
43. The COGP was established in November 1969 to study and recommend to
Congress methods "to promote the economy, efficiency and effectiveness" of government
procurement. Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, §§ 1-9, 83 Stat. 269, as
amended, Act of July 9, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-47, 85 Stat. 102. The 12-member commis-
sion and a staff of approximately 50 professionals produced its final report in 4 volumes
in December 1972. The study included consultations with approximately 12,000 persons
engaged in procurement; more than 2,000 meetings at 1,000 government, industry, and
academic facilities; and questionnaires from nearly 60,000 individuals and others con-
nected with procurement. Reports from study groups formed by the commission totaled
more than 15,000 pages. The final commission report contained 149 recommendations
for improving government procurement. 1 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at vii-viii.
44. An entire chapter of the report is devoted to debarment and suspension pro-
cedures. See 4 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 61-68. In addition, various aspects of
debarment and suspension are discussed in 1 id. at 123-24 and 4 id. at 9-10.
45. 4 id. at 66. The quoted statement may not be entirely accurate if individual
department implementing regulations are included. Its general thrust, however, is on
point.
46. Home Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See text accom-
panying notes 51-53 infra.
47. This recommendation was one of four made in a chapter entitled "National
Policies Implemented Through the Procurement Process." Among other observations,
the commission noted that while some statutes and regulations providing for implementa-
tion of socio-economic policies through the procurement process provide for debarment
in the event of violation, others do not. Examples cited dealt with convict labor, labor
surplus, and bonds for public works. The commission also noted that while some debar-
ment provisions (for example, Davis-Bacon) specify the period of debarment, others de-
scribe a maximum period or an indefinite period that will end when the contractor dem-
onstrates compliance with program requirements. The report remarked that "[tihe in-
definite debarment period reflects the current trend." 1 COGP REPORT, supra note 1,
at 123. Among alternative sanctions to debarment, the commission suggested the use
of fines. This particular suggestion was rejected by the task group formed to study the
recomm~endation. See notes 63-95 and accompanying text infra.
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cerning due process requirements, and it urged a review having as its
goal published, uniform, expeditious, and fair rules.
48
Following the issuance of the COGP report, the executive branch
of the government organized task groups to deal with each of the
commission's recommendations. One such task group concerned itself
with the debarment process, as will be described.49 In May of 1972,
however, even before the report was completed, the decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Home
Brothers, Inc. v.. Laird" had resulted in a flurry of activity by the
executive branch to revise the procedures for suspension of government
contractors.
The Suspension Revision of 1974
The controversy in Homne Brothers arose when the Navy summarily
suspended Home Brothers because of suspected wrongdoing. 51 The
court criticized the total absence in the regulations of any right to a
hearing in such cases and stated that while a temporary suspension for a
short period, not to exceed one month, might be permissible, for a
longer suspension "fairness requires that the bidder be given specific
notice as to at least some charges alleged against him, and be given, in
the usual case, an opportunity to rebut those charges. 52  On the other
48. 4 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 68. The Office of Federal Procurement
Policy was suggested as well-suited for this "thorough, expert policy review." The report
noted that the fundamental question was to what extent a number of the elements of
a trial-type hearing were required for debarment and suspension hearings. (The ACUS
recommendation of course was for a full trial-type hearing before debarment.)
49. See text accompanying notes 63-95 infra.
50. 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972). As with many other government-related de-
cisions, procurement decisions of this court are particularly important because of the
ready availability of department heads in the District of Columbia, although suits are
not limited to the D.C. courts. See D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, GOVERNMENT LIIGA-
TION 592 (1963).
51. Specifically, the Navy's letter of suspension, which is illustrative of the proc-
ess, stated: "Based upon an investigation conducted by the Naval Investigative Service,
this Command has substantial reason to believe that for a period of years including 1971
representatives of Home Brothers, Inc. have been giving gratuities and favors to Naval
personnel assigned to official contractual or inspection duties in relation to your com-
pany. These inducements or irregularities are considered to indicate a lack of business
integrity and to bring into serious question the present responsibility of your company
as a Government contractor. Accordingly, a decision has been made to place Home
Brothers, Inc., on the Joint List of Debarred, Ineligible and Suspended Contractors, in
a suspended status." Brief for Appellant at 5, Home Bros., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 73-
1325 (D.C. Cir., filed March 26, 1973). No other details were given.
52. 463 F.2d at 1270-71. Further in the opinion, the court amplified its thought
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hand, the court recognized that a full hearing might force the govern-
ment to reveal its case prior to a criminal indictment and trial. The
opinion discussed various possible ways to handle the balancing of these
competing interests.53 The 1962 ACUS report also dealt with these
same underlying considerations.
As a result of this decision, the government procurement fraternity
engaged in an overhaul of its suspension procedure regulations. Pro-
posed changes in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)
were extensively commented upon by the Section of Public Contract
Law of the American Bar Association (ABA) and by the Council of
Defense and Space Industry Associations.5 4  In mid-1974 the resulting
amendments were incorporated in the ASPR and the Federal Procure-
by describing the proceeeding as one "attended by the contractor and his representatives,
to provide an opportunity to offer evidence, to rebut charges and confront accusers, in
short, to demonstrate the lack of adequate evidence to warrant suspension." Id. at 1272.
53. See id. at 1271-72. The court said, "There may be reasons why the Govern-
ment should not be required to show any of its evidence to the contractor, particularly
reasons of national security, or, more likely, the concern that such a proceeding may
prejudice a prosecutorial action against the contractor. The Government may also be
concerned that a suspended contractor may seek a proceeding not so much to obtain re-
instatement as a bidder, but in order to obtain a discovery not generally provided to
criminal defendants." Id. at 1271. The court observed that the standard to sustain sus-
pension was only "adequate evidence," analogous to the probable cause necessary for an
arrest, a search warrant, or a preliminary hearing. Ordinarily, the government could
meet this standard without prejudicing the case. In situations in which it could not, the
court suggested a high-level determination that significant injury would result if a hear-
ing were to be held, adding that this determination could be reviewed by a court if chal-
lenged as arbitrary. In its second appeal, Home Brothers argued that it was precisely
when the government's case was weakest that the disclosure of adequate evidence would
most prejudice the future prosecution, and that a hearing therefore should be required
in every case of suspension. Home Brothers argued further that the failure to disclose
to a contractor the nature of the suspected wrongdoing makes it impossible for the con-
tractor to correct the wrong (for example, to fire the suspected employee) and thus re-
store itself to a responsible status. It was also charged that the draft regulations to com-
ply with the original decision had misinterpreted and distorted the court's guidelines.
Brief for Appellant at 25-31, 38-39.
54. The ABA group found in general that the proposed ASPR regulation ade-
quately dealt with the issues raised by the Home Brothers decision. Certain clarifica-
tions were suggested, and the group said that its comments were based upon the assump-
tion that the DOD intends actually to conduct a hearing in the adversary sense contem-
plated by the court. See Letter from the American Bar Association to ASPR Commit-
tee, March 27, 1973 [hereinafter cited as ABA Letter]. The Council of Defense and
Space Industry Associations suggested that several further revisions were necessary be-
fore fundamental fairness could be achieved, focusing on more detail in the notice and
hearing guidelines. See Letter from the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associa-
tions to ASPR Committee, March 26, 1973; FED. CoNT. REP. at A-1 (April 9,
1973). By and large, the final regulations followed the draft form.
ment Regulations (FPR).5 5 In their final form, these regulations re-
quire greater specificity in the notice of suspension, although the irregu-
larities prompting suspension are still to be described "in general terms,
without disclosing the Government's evidence."5 6  In addition, an op-
portunity for a hearing before an agency official is provided within
twenty days unless the suspension is based upon an outstanding indict-
ment or unless a hearing "would adversely affect possible civil or
criminal prosecution" against the private entity.57  The FPR also men-
tions adverse effect on possible labor proceedings. 58 The determination
of adverse effect is made upon advice from the Department of Justice
(or Labor), and if a hearing is denied, "any information or argument in
opposition to the suspension may be presented in person, in writing, or
through representation." 59 In no event may a suspension exceed eight-
een months unless legal proceedings have commenced.10
One should observe, as is stated above, 61 that suspensions are
relevant only in connection with "responsibility" grounds. The suspi-
cion that a private entity has committed a criminal act relating to
business integrity obviously triggers the procurement official's concern
about the responsibility of the bidder. In contrast, when "inducement"
grounds are involved, there is no reason to take any action on mere
suspicion of a violation, nor is there usually any concern about interfer-
ence with a criminal prosecution. Therefore, the suspension process is
unnecessary, and any action waits until a firm debarment decision is
made. 62
55. See ASPR 1-605, 3 GOV'T CONT. REP. 32,163 (1975); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.605
to -1.605-5 (1975).
56. ASPR 1-605.3, 3 GoV'T CONT. REP. 11 32,163.20 (1975); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-3
(1975).
57. ASPR 1-605.2(a)(1), 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,163.10 (1975); 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-1.605-4(d) (1975).
58. ASPR 1-605.2(a), 3 GoV'T CONT. REP. 32,163.10 (1975); 41 C.F.R. §
1-1.605-4(c) (1975).
59. ASPR 1-605.2(a)(2), 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,163.10 (1975); 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-1.605-4(e) (1975).
60. In its letter of comment, the ABA Section on Public Contract Law stated that
it believed this time period is too long and is subject to legal attack in the courts. The
group said, "If an investigation of a contractor or its employees is going to consume
more than several months without indictments, we feel that the Government is legally
obligated to continue to accept and fairly consider bids from the contractor with appro-
priate safeguards exercised internally by the Government to insure that the Government
is not victimized in any areas in which the contractor may be under investigation." See
ABA Letter, supra note 54. The 18-month rule followed one of the 1962 ACUS recom-
mendations. See ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 60-61.
61. See notes 11-34 and accompanying text supra.
62. The EPA regulations provide for the "listing" of a facility when an order of
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
March 19761 DEBARMENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 809
The Task Group Proposals of 1975
As already mentioned,6 3 following the issuance of the report of the
COGP, interagency task groups were formed to examine and recom-
mend executive branch positions on each of the 149 formal recommen-
dations of the commission.6 4  One such task group dealt with COGP
recommendation number 46, concerning debarment and suspension.
On May 22, 1975, the task group's proposals were made public. 5
The task group considered two areas of debarment. With respect
to the labor standards statutes which provide for debarment for viola-
tions, 6 the COGP report had pointed out that debarment procedures
under the Walsh-Healey Act and the Service Contracts Act of 1965
expressly provide for the equivalent of an APA section 7(c) hearing.67
The hearing provided before debarment under the Davis-Bacon Act
and the numerous related statutes dealing with minimum wages, how-
ever, is more limited: upon request, a party charged with violation may
receive "an informal proceeding . . . before a hearing examiner, a re-
gional director of the Wage and Hour Division, or any other Depart-
mental officer of appropriate ability"; and before the hearing the party
charged will have available any information disclosed by the investiga-
tion which is not privileged or found confidential for good cause.
68
Technically, under Davis-Bacon but not the related statutes, debarment
is handled by the GAO,69 but the GAO considers the Labor Department
the administrator is not complied with or a civil enforcement action has been brought.
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 15.20(a)(1)(iii), (vi) (1975). Listings on this ground must be lifted
within a year unless a criminal conviction or civil court ruling has been obtained. Id.
at § 15.20(c). Hence, in a sense, such a listing may be viewed as analogous to a sus-
pension.
63. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
64. The effort was initially directed and coordinated by the Office of Management
and Budget, but this responsibility was later shifted to the GSA. See Exec. Order No.
11,717, 3A C.F.RL 177 (1973).
65. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22318-19 (1975). The discussion in this article concerning
the task group and its proposals is based upon the Federal Register account, which was
prepared by the GSA.
66. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
67. The Administrative Procedure Act is expressly applicable to Walsh-Healey ac-
tions and hearings are expressly required. 41 U.S.C. §§ 39, 43a (1970). Detailed regu-
lations provide for extensive procedural protections before a trial examiner. See 41
C.F.R. 50-203 (1975). The Service Contract Act makes cross-reference to the Walsh-
Healey procedural provisions. See 41 U.S.C. § 353(a) (1970).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(c) (1975).
69. The Davis-Bacon Act expressly provides that the Comptroller General of the
United States shall "distribute a list . . . giving the names of persons or firms whom
he has found to have disregarded their obligations to employees and subcontractors." 40
U.S.C. § 276a-2 (1970). No such provision appears in the related acts. Authority to
debar for such violations was centralized in the Secretary of Labor by Reorganization
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findings and recommendations. 70 In commenting on the Davis-Bacon
procedure, the COGP report noted the following apparent weaknesses:
1) the party's file is made available ex parte, without opportunity for
confrontation of witnesses, 2) the nature of the hearing is discretionary
with the Department of Labor, and 3) no separation of function exists
between the officials proposing debarment and those who decide. 7' The
task group proposal states that the Department of Labor has spent much
time and money in preparing a consolidated labor statute which will
include provisions for uniform labor debarment procedures and intends
at some point to include a bill calling for such consolidation as part of
the Department of Labor legislative program.
72
The task group characterized its other area of study that of "ad-
ministrative debarment," presumably including all responsibility debar-
ments. The task group investigated administrative debarments from the
standpoint of both due process in debarment and suspension 73 cases and
uniformity of procedure. Focusing on "responsibility" debarments as
provided in the FPR and the ASPR, the task group contrasted the FPR
provision requiring that a hearing be granted under "procedural safe-
guards which satisfy the demands of fairness" as set forth in the regula-
tions of each agency,74 with the comparable ASPR provision, which
provides only that "information in opposition to a proposed debarment
Plan No. 14 of 1950, providing that the secretary should "prescribe appropriate stand-
ards, regulations and procedures." 5 U.S.C. App. 534 (1970). This authority was
held broad enough to permit debarment in Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell,
290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
70. The Secretary of Labor's regulations provide for an identical procedure
whether the violation is under Davis-Bacon or under one of the related acts, although
they of course recognized that with respect to Davis-Bacon actions, any action is subject
to "action to be taken by the Comptroller General." 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(c) (1975). GAO
has established certain procedures which it is to follow, specifying the criteria for reports
to be submitted and for recommendations of the agency concerned and of the Depart-
ment of Labor.
71. 4 COGP REPORT, supra note 1. at 62. The due process adequacy of the Da-
vis-Bacon procedure, particularly the failure to produce witnesses for cross-examination,
was challenged in Framlau Corp. v. Dembling, 360 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Al-
though the court seemed to view with general approval the entire regulatory procedure,
the precise holding was that no such right to cross-examine at the appellate level was
required by due process. The contractor had not sought such a right at the original
hearing.
72. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22319 (1975). It was stated that such a bill would be part
of the Department's program for the current 94th Congress, but it is understood that
this will not be the case. See id.
73. With respect to suspension procedures, the published proposal simply refers to
the 1974 amendments as having overtaken the COGP report in that area, and apparently
concludes that the revised suspension procedures meet due process requirements. See id.
74. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604-1 (1975).
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may be presented in person, in writing or through representation.1
75
The task force proposal stated that the group believed the FPR provi-
sion adequately handled the due process issue and recommended that
ASPR be similarly amended "by providing for a hearing in the interest
of due process." The Department of Transportation member disagreed,
believing that administrative procedures for debarment should be con-
ducted in the same manner as that provided in the Labor Department
statutes, which require full due process consideration before administra-
tive law judges. (Administrative debarments are heard before agency
personnel.)
76
An examination of the implementing regulations developed by the
individual civilian agencies casts more light on the effect of the FPR
requirement of a hearing prior to debarment. These regulations differ
somewhat, but the major agencies subject to the FPR usually have gone
beyond the minimum they set forth. The General Services Administra-
tion (GSA), for example, requires debarment hearings to be held before
the administrator or by a hearing authority, thus separating the prose-
cuting and judging functions,77 and -the GSA hearings provide for the
participation of counsel, the questioning of witnesses, and procedures
similar insofar as practicable to those used by the Board of Contract
Appeals. 8 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) expressly provides for witnesses and counsel.79 The Depart-
ment of Agriculture, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),80 and the
75. ASPR 1-604.3, 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,162.15 (1975). When the ground
for debarment is violation of the gratuities clause, an administrative determination of
such violation is made only after a full hearing. Also, of course, when debarment is
based on a criminal conviction of the precise person debarred, a full due process hearing
has perforce been held on that factual issue. Cf. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570,
578 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1964). As a result of the July 1974 amendment to the suspension
procedures, the literal terms of the ASPR regulations now afford the possibility of
greater due process protection in cases of suspension than in cases of debarment. The
ABA committee pointed out this situation in its comments on the draft suspension regu-
lations. See ABA Letter, supra note 54. It might be noted that the FPR in requiring
a hearing explains that "at the minimum information in opposition to the proposed de-
barment may be presented, in person or in writing, and, if desired through an appropri-
ate representative." 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.604-1 (1975).
76. The minority report states in summary: "It is my view that due process should
be provided from the beginning of debarment considerations, and that it is both prac-
ticable and necessary to consider statutory and regulatory debarment together rather
than separately to arrive at optimum Government-wide uniformity." 40 Fed. Reg. 22319
(1975).
77. See 41 C.F.R. 99 5-1.604-1, jA-1.604-1 (1975).
78. Id. H9 5-1.606.53, 5A-1.604-1(d) (2).
79. See id. § 3-1.604-1(b).
80. The AEC's existence as such of course terminated in 1974 with the establish-
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Department of Transportation (DOT) provide for hearings before their
Boards of Contract Appeals."' The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), on the other hand, follows the ASPR text. 2
The task group recommends that both the procedures and the substan-
tive grounds for administrative debarment be made uniform among all
government agencies, presumably under the aegis of the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy."3
The published task group proposal does not specifically mention
procedures for "inducement" debarments other than the procedures
based on the labor statutes. Under the Buy American Act, each
individual agency determines violations, but apparently no regulations
have been promulgated specifically covering the procedures to be fol-
lowed.84  The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) recent regu-
lations under the Clean Air and Water Pollution Acts 5 require a
"Listing Proceeding" before any adverse action takes place. This pro-
cedure calls for notice and an opportunity to confer with the deciding
official and to present information orally or in writing, with counsel.8, If
a facility is listed and a request for removal is denied, the regulation
provides for a full-scale hearing similar to a trial.8 7  Debarment based
on the fourth inducement debarment ground, violation of the equal
ment of the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission. Act of Oct. 11, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (Supp. IV, 1974) ).
81. See 41 C.F.R. § 4-1.604-1 (1975); id. § 9-1.606-54 (1974); id. § 12-1.604-
1 (1975).
82. See id. § 18-1.604-4 (1974).
83. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22319 (1975). One of the major recommendations of the
COGP was the creation of a central Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Execu-
tive Office of the President to take the leadership in procurement policy and related mat-
ters. See 1 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Legislation providing for the establish-
ment of such an office was approved on August 30, 1974. See 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-
12 (Supp. 1975). The office is headed by Hugh E. Witt, an experienced procurement
official.
84. But see 41 C.F.R. § 1-18.606 (1975).
85. The final regulations appear at 40 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-15.41 (1975). The Clean
Air and Water Pollution Control Acts both expressly authorize debarment for criminal
convictions of violation of their terms. In addition, the EPA regulations provide for
debarment (technically a "listing" of a facility) upon civil adjudications and administra-
tive findings of noncompliance. The effect of debarment extends to grants and loans,
as well as contracts, exceeding $100,000. It should be noted that when listing of a fa-
cility follows a civil or criminal adjudication, the contractor has already had one trial-
type hearing. If the debarment results from administrative findings of noncompliance,
it must be removed within a year absent a court adjudication. Id. § 15.20(c).
86. 40 C.F.R. § 15.20(a)(2) (1975).
87. Id. §§ 15.20(c), 15.21.
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opportunity clause, is imposed only after procedures"' which, in the
words of the COGP report, "go far in providing 'safeguards' normally
associated with adversary hearings .. ."89
Another special area is Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) debarments and suspensions, which, as will be shown
hereafter,9" constitute the major proportion of reported activity in the
deparment/suspension area today. Such action excludes the debarred
or suspended entity from any HUD program, whether by way of con-
tract or grant. The grounds for such debarment may be statutory0 ' or
administrative.92 In both cases, however, the grounds usually relate to
responsibility rather than achievement of social or economic goals,
because the statutory grounds, which appear in section 512 of the
National Housing Act, concern offenses under the National Housing Act
or the Veteran's Administration loan program (or contracts thereunder)
and the administrative grounds are similar to those in ASPR and FPR.
In other words, the basis for debarment or suspension is actual or
suspected wrongdoing in connection with a HUD contract, grant, or
loan program. Somewhat oddly, perhaps, section 512 debarments and
administrative debarments are dealt with in separate regulations, despite
their similarity. Before a section 512 debarment can take place, the
accused party is entitled to written notice specifying the charges in
reasonable detail, to an opportunity to be heard, and to representation
by counsel before the deciding official, who is also the person initiating
the action. The deciding official must base the determination on the
preponderance of the evidence.93  Administrative debarments are gov-
erned by extensive due process procedures promulgated in 1971. Hear-
ings are held before a departmental hearing officer, who is responsible
for the "fair and expeditious conduct" of the proceedings, counsel are
permitted, and a record of the proceedings is made available to the
parties upon request. A similar hearing is provided prior to a suspen-
sion.94
88. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.26 to -1.27 (1968). Debarment under the Rehabilita-
tion Act follows the same full trial-type hearings used for the Service Contract Act or
is carried out "in accordance with procedures prescribed by the contract." Id. §
1-12.1309.
89. 4 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 66 n.23.
90. See note 102 and accompanying text infra.
91. See National Housing Act § 512, 12 U.S.C. § 1731(a) (1970).
92. See 24 C.F.R. H9 24.0-24.10 (1975).
93. Id. §§ 200.190-200.194. Although the regulations prescribe the described pro-
cedure, it is understood that in practice, section 512 actions follow the same procedure
as administrative debarments.
94. Id. §§ 24.0-24.10. One possible objection is that the hearing officer is
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In summary, then, a general review of formal debarment/suspen-
sion procedures in the federal establishment shows that the 1962 ACUS
recommendation of a "trial-type hearing before an impartial agency
board or hearing examiner"95 prior to debarment is not in universal
effect, although a number of agencies have taken steps to expand
procedural rights, and improvements seem to continue.
For a full assessment of the nature and extent of the due process
problem in debarments and suspensions, one must turn to an examina-
tion of the numbers and types of debarments and suspensions actually
occurring today.
Debarment and Suspension in Action
The elaborate statutory and regulatory structure for debarment and
suspension described above,9" together with the several past and contin-
uing studies and activities in the area, might suggest that such actions
are common in the federal government. The facts indicate the contrary.
Information on debarments and suspensions is not collected in one
single place. There presently exist three "centralized" lists, in GAO,
GSA, and the Department of Defense (DOD). The GAO list, some-
times termed the "statutory debarment list," covers debarments for
violations of labor statutes and of the equal opportunity clause.97 The
GSA list covers all administrative debarments, including those by the
DOD.98  The DOD list is a joint consolidated list of debarred, ineligible,
drawn from the HUD general counsel's office, which is also responsible for representing
HUD at the hearing.
95. ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 273.
96. See notes 11-34 and accompanying text supra.
97. This list is issued "to heads of departments, independent establishments and
other agencies of the United States and the District of Columbia." Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, Government Accounting Office, Consolidated List of Persons or Firms
Currently Debarred for Violations for Various Public Contracts Acts Incorporating La-
bor Standards Provisions. It is unclassified and is issued by the office of the general
counsel of the GAO. The list includes debarments arising out of violation of the equal
opportunity clause, as determined by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.
98. This GSA list is entitled "Consolidated List of Current Administrative Debar-
ments by Executive Agencies," and is maintained under the authority of 41 C.F.R. §§
1-1.606 and 1-1.607 (1975). Those sections require that each agency that administra-
tively debars a contractor (that is, for nonresponsibility grounds as authorized by 41
C.F.R. § 1-1.604(a) (1975)), or that debars a contractor for violation of the Buy
American Act, furnish GSA with a notice of such debarment and, when the debarment
is removed, notice of removal. GSA in turn is required to distribute a listing of all de-
barments so reported. Unlike the GAO, which lists debarred contractors under the spe-
cific statutes violated, the GSA lists the debarred contractors alphabetically, with the "ba-
sis of action" separately set forth. The list is classified "For Official Use Only." HUD
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and suspended contractors who are thereby unable to compete for DOD
business; thus, it includes the statutory and administrative debarments
by other agencies that apply to DOD. 9  The lists, then, overlap in
part.100 Also, agencies keep their own lists similar to the DOD consoli-
dated list; for example, HUD maintains a list applicable to HUD,
published quarterly. 1 1
An examination of the lists'0 indicates that at the beginning of
1975 there were 458 firms in a debarred status, as follows:
HUD 334
National Housing Act 272
Secretary 61
Other 1
Walsh-Healey and Service Contracts Acts 70
Davis-Bacon and related labor acts 24
debarments undertaken under section 512 of the National Housing Act nevertheless ap-
pear on this list, because debarment under section 512 is by HUD directive a ground
for administrative debarment applicable to all HUD contractors and grantees. 24
C.F.R. § 24.9(a) (6) (1975). Section 512 by its terms only debars from participation
in certain loan programs stated therein.
99. This DOD Consolidated List, maintained by the Department of the Army on
behalf of all defense components, is the only consolidated list currently containing sus-
pension information. ASPR 1-601.3, 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 32,159 (1975), provides
for this consolidated list and also provides that each defense component will maintain
its own list. The consolidated list is no longer classified, although the underlying data
is. See ASPR 1-601.4, 3 Gov'r CONT. REP. 32,162.05 (1975). Although it might
appear that the list would be the most complete of the three, the absence of any of the
HUD administrative debarments makes the list deceptively short. Administrative debar-
ment by one component of the federal government may be a ground for debarment by
another component but is not mandatorily so; in the Defense Department, however, a
debarment or suspension by any component automatically takes effect throughout the
department. ASPR 1-604, 1-605.1, 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. 1 32,162, 32,163.05 (1975).
100. The debarment and suspension task group "strongly advocates" that the Office
of Procurement Policy take over responsibility for preparing and issuing a consolidation
of all contractor suspension, debarment, and ineligibility lists. A consequence would be
that a contractor debarred or suspended by one agency would be considered debarred
or suspended government-wide, although the task group conditions this feature on the
establishment of uniform grounds for such actions which would be applicable govern-
ment-wide. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22319 (1975).
101. The HUD list is entitled "Consolidated List of Debarred, Suspended and In-
eligible Contractors and Grantees" and is unclassified. See 24 C.F.R. § 24.6 (1975).
Because of the activity of HUD in this area, the list is considerably longer than any
of the major consolidated lists. The FPR require every agency to keep its own list, but
it is understood that in fact few do. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.602 (1975).
102. These figures have been analyzed as accurately as possible. It should be
noted, however, that because of time lag and other factors, certain discrepancies exist
among the lists. The data are taken from the GSA list of December 2, 1974 and the
GAO list of January 2, 1975.
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DOD (combined) 12
GSA 9
Exec. Order 11,246 (equal opportunity) 5
Other 4
The sum of these numbers represents the total number of debarments.
The annual debarment figure (that is, the number of additions to the
list) was 97, as follows:
HUD 49
National Housing Act 7
Secretary 42
Walsh-Healey and Service Contracts Acts 33
Davis-Bacon and related labor acts 6
DOD (combined) 5
Exec. Order 11,246 4
An examination of the actual debarments taking place and of the
due process procedures provided in each case, as discussed above, 03
shows that of the ninety-seven debarments, seventy-nine were con-
ducted under procedures which approximate the trial-type hearing.
These procedures were used at the HUD administrative debarments,
and the debarments under the Walsh-Healey and Service Contracts Acts
and the equal opportunity clause. Thirteen of the debarments involved
the Davis-Bacon and related labor acts or the National Housing Act,
statutes which expressly provide for a hearing of a lesser nature.
Suspensions, which are always administratively imposed, do not
appear on the GSA list, and so government-wide figures are unavailable.
The DOD list, however, does contain information on suspension and
shows only fifteen firms in that status as of the beginning of 1975; the
HUD list shows 217 suspensions. Since all HUD suspensions are admin-
istrative, they are subject to the same full hearing requirement imposed
for debarment, as mentioned above;10 4 the DOD suspensions are now
subject to the revised ASPR regulation on suspensions, which went into
effect on July 1, 1975.105
One may contrast present procedures with the situation existing at
the time of the 1962 ACUS study. At that time,10 6 there were no
debarments or suspensions recorded from the predecessors of HUD, the
103. See notes 66-94 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra.
105. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.605-1.606 (1974).
106. The GAO consolidated list of administrative debarments of August 1, 1962,
showed only three administrative debarments outside of the DOD, of which two were
by the DOA, one by the VA.
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department which now accounts for the great majority of all debarments
and suspensions. Nevertheless, some 340 firms were in debarred or
suspended status, as follows: 10
7
Debarred under Walsh-Healey Act 170
Debarred under Davis-Bacon and related labor acts 34
Debarred by DOD 39
Suspended by DOD 77
One can only speculate as to the reasons for the decline in debar-
ments and suspensions outside of HUD.108 Possibly, rather than using
the more complex procedures now required for formal debarments and
suspensions, somewhat the same result is being achieved through ad-
verse determinations on the "responsibility" of a prospective bidder'0 9 in
each individual case, perhaps by using the "experience lists" maintained
by some agencies." 0 No widespread complaints of such actions have
107. ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 273 n.1.
108. The DOD consolidated list of January 1, 1970, contains 32 defense suspen-
sions and 11 defense debarments. The comparable list of January 1, 1966, contains 29
defense suspensions and 24 defense debarments. One factor that might explain the pau-
city of suspension in the 1970's is the period of uncertainty following the Home Brothers
decision and continuing until the effective date of the new suspension regulations in mid-
1974. A comparison of the defense consolidated lists at the beginning of 1974 and the
beginning of 1975 indicates that no new suspension action occurred in 1974, at least none
that continued until the first day of 1975.
109. Cf. 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 804 (1965). The successive use of nonresponsibility
determinations in lieu of debarment, however, would violate the comptroller general's re-
quirements set forth in 43 Comp. Gen. 140 (1963). That opinion involved two succes-
sive nonresponsibility determinations based on the same criminal offense. Under such
circumstances, debarment procedures had to be invoked, because to conclude otherwise
"would necessarily result in authorizing contracting agencies to continue indefinitely to
disregard low bids by successive determinations of nonresponsibility, and without afford-
ing the bidder opportunity to be heard." Id. at 141. Therefore, when a nonresponsibil-
ity finding is based upon a criminal offense, the steps to debar should be taken at the
same time as the criminal prosecution. See also 43 Comp. Gen. 387 (1963).
110. Both ASPR and FPR require that a contracting officer, in reaching a deter-
mination on responsibility, make maximum use of currently valid information on file
within the agency. They also require that each agency "shall, at such level and in such
manner as it deems appropriate, maintain records and experience data which shall be
made readily available for use by contracting officers . . . ." 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1205-
1(b) (1975); accord, ASPR 1-905.1(b), 3 Gov'T CONT. REP. f 32,250 (1975). At least
four agencies, the Defense Supply Agency, the Navy, the Air Force, and the GSA, pro-
vide by regulation for a formal "Contractor Experience List" or "Review List of Bid-
ders." See 32 C.F.R. H§ 1001.905-50, 1201.950 (1975); 41 C.F.R. § 5A-l.1205-50
(1975). The Air Force Contractor Experience List, for example, is maintained by the
directorate of procurement policy at Air Force headquarters, and includes contractors
whose performance has been unsatisfactory "or whose responsibility is questioned for
other specific reasons." 32 C.F.R. § 1001.905-50(d) (5) (1975). Prior to being placed
on the list, the contractor is given notice of the specific deficiencies. He has 15 days
reached the current published literature."' The 1962 ACUS report
attempted to deal with this possible problem by making it clear that its
requirement of a hearing similar to a trial should be interpreted broadly
to cover every form of agency black-listing of proposed contractors or
subcontractors,"' and the report further recommended that any govern-
ment rejection of a bid on grounds of lack of business integrity or
business honesty be preceded by a written explanation of the reasons for
that determination "and by the opportunity for such proposed contractor
or subcontractor to reply to the contracting officer within a reasonable
period of time . . , 3 This recommendation has not been put into
effect, but a bidder rejected on grounds of nonresponsibility may follow
the usual route for protest of awards."
4
within which to present reasons why he should not be listed. Id. at § 1001.905-50(e)
(2). The Air Force regulation states clearly, as do the other provisions, that a listing
will not be interpreted to bar an award to a contractor: "The CEL's [Contractor Ex-
perience List] have no relationship to the Joint Consolidated List of Debarred, Ineligible
and Suspended Contractors, and the inclusion of any contractor on a CEL will not in
any sense be regarded as a determination of debarment or ineligibility." The purpose
of the listing is to alert contracting officers to possible difficulties. Id. at § 1001.905-
50(b)-(c). The GSA characterizes firms on its "Review List" as ones which "because
of questionable responsibility, require extraordinary consideration before award of con-
tracts ...... The list is marked "For Official Use Only," and private parties are not
to be apprised of it in any way whatsoever. No notice is provided to a listed contractor
at any time. On the other hand, when a bid is rejected on grounds of nonresponsibility,
the contracting officer must promptly notify the bidder by letter, settting forth the rea-
sons for the rejection, to provide an opportunity for the correction of the offending prac-
tices prior to future offerings. Nonetheless, "[t]he List shall not be cited as a reason
for, or factor contributing to, the nonresponsibility determination." 41 C.F.R. § 5A-
1.1205-50 (1975).
111. The 1962 ACUS Study, taking note of such lists, stated that de facto debar-
ments based thereon appeared to be widespread, although the conclusion seemed based
on inference. See ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 276-77. The published account of
a conference in Philadelphia last year which discussed debarment and suspension, among
other things, made no special mention of de facto debarments. See BNA FED. CoNT.
REP. No. 521, at A-18 to -20 (March 11, 1974). CODSIA, commenting on the draft
suspension regulations, stated, "Examples of flagrant abuse of a company's rights are
rare." Letter from the Council on Defense and Space Industry Associations to ASPR
Committeee, March 26, 1973. The COGP Report, made after numerous opportunities
for public complaint about flaws in the procurement process, raised no issues of preva-
lent de facto debarment.
112. Sve ACUS REPORT, supra note 13, at 281. The report specifically includes
as such conduct "de facto debarments or debarment-type actions such as inclusion on
agency or bureau 'review lists' or 'experience lists' of firms of questionable responsibil-
ity." Id.
113. Id. at 62; see Comment, Due Process in Public Contracts: Pre-Aiward Hear-
ings to Determine Responsibility of Bidders, 5 PAC. L.J. 142 (1974); cf. Housing Au-
thority v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959).
114. See 4 COGP REPORT, supra note 1, at 35-49. Generally speaking, when a
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The paucity of litigation also indicates the absence of a large
amount of federal activity in the field of debarment and suspension. In
1964, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided Gonzalez v. Freeman,115 in which a private firm was debarred
for five years from participating in contracts with the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC), a corporate instrumentality established by Con-
gress. No hearing was provided, nor were any grounds stated for the
action, although it seemed fairly evident that it stemmed from misuse of
official inspection certificates, which had resulted in a misdemeanor
conviction. The CCC had not issued any regulations authorizing or
governing debarment. In the opinion, then Circuit Judge Warren
Burger made it clear that a debarred contractor had standing to bring
suit 1 6 and that the action was subject to judicial review. The narrow
holding on the merits was that while the statute establishing the CCC by
implication authorized such debarment, Congress did not intend to
authorize such debarment "without either regulations establishing stand-
bidder feels he has been wrongfully denied an award, he may protest to the GAO. The
GAO has developed a procedure for reviewing such protests, which number in the hun-
dreds each year. The contracting agency files a report on the protest, with a copy fur-
nished to the protestor. The protestor may request a conference regarding the merits
of the protest with members of the Office of the General Counsel of the GAO. 40 Fed.
Reg. 17979 (1975). In addition, it would appear that a disappointed bidder could seek
relief through judicial action, under the Scanwell doctrine. See Blackhawk Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But cf. Wheelabrator Corp.
v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Numerous articles discuss this whole pro-
test process. See, e.g., Speidel, fudicial and Administrative Review of Government
Contract Awards, 37 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 63 (1972); Comment, The Role of GAO
and Courts in Government Conflict "Bid Protests": An Analysis of Post-Scanwell Reme-
edies, 1972 Dutr L. 745. The GAO, in ruling on protests based on determinations
of nonresponsibility, uses the standard that whether evidence of lack of integrity is suffi-
cient to warrant a nonresponsibility finding is a matter primarily for evaluation by the
contracting agency. Therefore, the GAO "will not substitute [its] judgment for that of
the contracting agency unless it is shown that the agency's determination was not based
on substantial evidence demonstrating the bidder's lack of responsibility." 39 Comp.
Gen. 468, 471-72 (1959). In addition, it assumes that the administrative determination
will be based on "clear and convincing evidence." 39 Comp. Gen. 868, 872 (1960);
cf. Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 612 (Ct. Cl. 1965). When small
businesses are involved, the Small Business Administration (SBA) will review nonre-
sponsibility determinations- based on lack of integrity, tenacity, or perseverance, and the
protestor may appeal such determinations to the head of the procuring agency. Deci-
sions by the SBA as to a small business's "capacity and credit" are binding on a contract-
ing officer, but decisions as to integrity are not. ASPR 1-705.4, 3 Gov'T CONT. REP.
32,194.20 (1975); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.705-6, 1-1.708 (1975); see 54 Comp. Gen. 703
(1975).
115. 334 F.2d at 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
116. Accord, Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
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ards and a procedure which are both fair and uniform or basically fair
treatment of appellants."' 17  While avoiding the constitutional issue
directly, the opinion was replete with references to "the obligation to
deal with uniform minimum fairness" and the need for "safeguards
which satisfy the demands of fairness." Indeed, one passage suggested
that only the full trial-type hearing would suffice in debarments:
Thi governmental power must be exercised in accordance with ac-
cepted basic legal norms. Considerations of basic fairness require
administrative regulations establishing standards for debarment and
procedures which will include notice of specific charges, opportu-
nity to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses, all
culminating in administrative findings and conclusions based upon
the record so made."18
This is strong language. Yet in the decade since Gonzalez v.
Freeman, only a single reported case has arisen directly bearing on this
area, that of Home Brothers, Inc. v. Laird,"9 described above, 120
involving suspension."12  During this decade, as has been much not-
ed,"' numerous cases have been decided by the Supreme Court assert-
ing and reasserting in a myriad of contexts the necessity for due process
protection consistent with countervailing governmental considera-
tions."'
Furthermore, a dramatic change in the judicial attitude toward the
government contract area itself occurred in 1970. For a generation, it
was thought that a private contractor usually had no right to complain
about the way in which the government administered its contracting
process. In the leading case of Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.," 4 the
Court expounded this doctrine:
117. 334 F.2d at 580.
118. Id. at 578.
119. 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
120. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra.
121. Framlau Corp. v. Dembling, 360 F. Supp, 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973), tangentially
involved the due process issue in a labor standards setting, but the holding directly con-
cerned only a determination of a wage standard violation, since the Wage Appeals Board
had recommended against debarment.
122. See, e.g., Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky.
L.J. 531 (1975); Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1974, 27 ADMIN. L. REV.
113 (1975); Symposium on Due Process, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1974). The seminal
case in the so-called "due process revolution" was, of course, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
123. See text accompanying notes 130-39 infra.
124. 310 U.S. 113 (1940). The precise holding of the case was that a private firm
had no standing to challenge a wage determination by the Secretary of Labor under the
Walsh-Healey Act, but the sweeping language of the decision by Justice Black was
widely construed to bar all generalized attacks on the government procurement process.
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Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the
unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those
with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon
which it will make needed purchases. ... [The Public Contracts
Act] was not intened to be a bestowal of litigable rights upon
those desirous of selling to the Government .... 125
In Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,126 in a lengthy opinion by
Judge Tanum, the doctrinal sweep of this exclusion of governmental
contract matters from judicial review was effectively undercut by the
court's recognition of the right of a disappointed bidder on a govern-
ment contract to challenge in court the legality of the governments
action. While the exact limits of this extension of judicial review to
government contracting are still being worked out,127 the case and its
progeny justify the conclusion that "judicial influence on Government
contracts is, on the whole, waxing in importance."' 28  The Scanwell
case, like Gonzales and Home Brothers, was widely discussed and well-
known in the government contracts bar. In a litigious age, with the
private government contracts bar an organized and vocal group and
with substantial economic interest at stake, the small number of re-
ported cases at least suggest the limited nature of the problem.
Conclusion
Whether common or rare, however, a decision to debar or
suspend-and perforce the procedures whereby the decision is
reached--can be of transcendent importance to the contractor involved.
True it is that these procedures have been and are yet the subject of
extensive and continuing study. The 1962 ACUS report covered in
exhaustive detail the underlying factual situation and relevant policy
considerations. The COGP again surveyed the same area a decade
later. The Labor'Department is said to be in the process of developing
a comprehensive statute on labor standards debarments. An executive
branch task group has recently reviewed administrative debarments and
suspensions. The suspension procedures were amended just a year ago
Of course, once the government has entered into a contract with a private concern, judi-
cially-protected rights arise which are enforceable against the United States under the
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
125. 310 U.S. at 127.
126. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
127. See, e.g., Note, The Private Rights of Bidders in the Award of a Government
Contract: A Step Beyond Scanwell, 24 CAsE W. RIs. L. Rnv. 559 (1973). See Lefko-
witz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Kohl, 63 NJ. 1, 304 A.2d
193, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 860 (1973).
128. J. WHear, & R. PAsLEY, FEDEA.L GOvERNMENT CoNTRAcrs 1240 (1975).
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to expand the due process coverage, after study and comment from
private groups.
Ever so haltingly and so slowly, the federal government edges
toward the goal of the ACUS's key 1962 recommendation. To sound a
refrain: surveying the area in its entirety, the conference concluded that
the agencies should go the whole way, that regardless of the ground or
nature of debarment, statutory or administrative, inducement or respon-
sibility, formal or informal, the parties should have the opportunity "to
have a trial-type hearing before an impartial agency board or hearing
examiner in the event there are disputed questions of fact.' 29
This straightforward and clear recommendation is still a sound
standard. The reluctance of the government to implement this recom-
mendation seems to stem from several sources. In part, no doubt, the
reluctance is simply inertia. It seems to be perceived that the more the
due process, the slower the action, and the procurement community's
basic task is to get the goods delivered to the government. The need for
and purpose to be served by a hearing is questioned. The problem of
hearing costs is raised. The reluctance of the procurement community
to permit the debarment power to pass out of its hands into those of a
hearing officer may reflect a belief that debarment, flowing from a
determination of the overall "responsibility" of a prospective bidder, is
essentially a procurement decision which should be made by procure-
ment officials. Likewise, in the case of inducement debarment, those
responsible for achieving the social and economic goals sought by the
government may feel a need to retain direct control of the weapon of
debarment. These and related considerations were, of course, fully
vented at the time of the 1962 ACUS recommendation, and the balance
was seen to tip in favor of a full trial-type hearing.
Furthermore, the legal setting since 1962 has undergone a revolu-
tion. The Gonzalez and Scanwell decisions have effectively negated
any assertion that government contracting is a privilege rather than a
right to which the due process clause can attach. While only the
Gonzalez and Home Brothers cases bear directly upon the extent of due
process required in debarments and suspensions, the Supreme Court in
case after case over the past half-decade has emphasized the breadth and
force of the constitutional requirement of procedural fairness embraced
in the due process clause. This development is a familiar story and will
129. ACUS REPoRT, supra note 13, at 60. Suspensions as opposed to debarments,
of course, present special considerations. See text accompanying notes 41, 51-60 supra.
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not be rechronicled here in detail.3 0 Goldberg v. Kelly,' 3' in which the
Court held that a welfare receipient is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
before the termination of benefits, was of course the seminal case. The
constitutional emanations from that case as to a hearing right prior to
adverse governmental action are reflected in holdings relating to re-
plevin actions, 132 to automobile license revocations, 33 to employment in
public colleges when de facto tenure was alleged, 34 to revocations of
parole, 3 and just last term to ten-day suspensions of high school
students.138
These decisions, to be sure, make clear that "the interpretation and
application of the Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters'
3 7
and that "[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situa-
tion."' 38 They emphasize that "the nature of the hearing will depend
on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved."' 39
Surely, the balancing process that led to the view over a decade
ago, in a quite different legal setting, that fairness required a trial-type
hearing on disputed facts in debarments-through which businesses
might be driven into bankruptcy-would not today yield a different
result. The scale still tips the same way. Indeed, the question should
be: has not the time long since come for acknowledgment by the federal
government's contracting community that the wave of the due process
revolution has reached its shores as well?
130. See note 122 supra.
131. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
132. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
133. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
134. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
135. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
136. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Of course, the process was not one
of unbroken plaintiff victories. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
137. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975).
138. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
139. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).

